To change behaviour it helps to understand all behaviour as best we can. Several articles examine the reasons for us behaving as we do – the various forces and principles that determine our actions. The article on biological values describes the way that, unsurprisingly, our conscious and deliberate human behaviour is grounded in our unconscious and mindless biological history. The article on moral psychology extends this theme by looking at unconscious human motivation, the psychological origins of our human moral intuitions. The article on morality is an introduction to ethics as the study of the principles and rules that govern right action with a brief overview of the world’s major moral theories. Two articles, purpose & value and science and morality explore the relationship between the world of science and the world of values. All these articles are then drawn on to investigate the role of practical or applied environmental ethics in our collective human management of sustainability and the world environment.
Anyone who is curious about what might constitute a ‘good life’ will feel the need, at some time or other, to examine the nature of morality, especially since we often live our lives in an uncritical way, making moral decisions that are often inconsistent, and sometimes contradictory.
Moral philosophers help us to think more clearly about morality by providing a framework of ideas that have been developed by generations of people thinking about ethical problems. As with any specialist discipline there is technical terminology, but this is quickly mastered.
Accelerating globalization has facilitated the economic connection of the world’s countries. Interconnection via the internet has familiarized us with the global range of religions and ideologies and races are intermingling more than ever before. More than ever before it is critical that we find common values.
We need to distinguish those factors that unite rather than divide. How can our values and morals negotiate the need to meet an increasing number of global objectives while retaining our group identities?
For the environmentalist any vision of a sustainable future must include consideration of the entire planet and its cargo of life. The designation ‘Anthropocene’ draws our attention to the recent increase of influence of human activity on the planet as the human population has grown from about 2 billion after World War II to approach 8 billion today. Coupled with an acceleration in globalization the human drain on the resources of the biosphere have created global environmental problems that constitute one of the existential threats that we confront in the new era of Informatia.
Humans, the biosphere, and planetary resources are closely inter-related and these interdependencies must be reflected in our values. This relationship is addressed directly in the article on environmental ethics, but first it will help to become familiar with the language, principles and procedures of ethicists themselves.
Morality (mores – habit, custom) or ethics (ethos – habit, custom) is the most practical of all subjects because it is what guides our actions. It can be characterized, in general terms, as the study of right action and those rules or principles (norms or normative rules) that govern our behavior. It is these ‘norms’ that determine how we manage our social, economic, and environmental decision-making – so they underpin our management of sustainability at all scales.
We are not going to solve moral questions here: but you can be morally brave and, as you read through the various moral positions outlined below, you can critically examine the way you establish your own ethical views within the general framework of ethical ideas and the way you think humanity can create a better future.
This article is one of a series looking critically at the connections between ethics, biology, sustainability, and the environment.
The moral landscape in a nutshell
First, a few ground rules for this article: there is no philosophical distinction between ethics and morality; in philosophy statements that can be true or false are called propositions; ‘objective’, as used in this article, means ‘mind-independent’. The links between our values, beliefs, attitudes and our behaviour are complex, as are their consequences. What is ethically important, and what is not, is itself a major philosophical question of ethical degree. Here I simply point out that my preference for white wine and the colour maroon is more a personal matter and of less moral consequence than my attitude to civil rights.
Moral philosophy can be divided into three main areas of study:
Applied ethics – (practical ethics) addresses specific and pressing ethical problems of the day (poverty, climate change, abortion, diet etc.)
Normative ethics –explores the general rules and principles that guide our behaviour – what it is that makes actions right. Normative ethics gives us frameworks and theories to help us address the problems of applied ethics. Ethicists recognize three major theories – virtue ethics, deontological ethics, and consequentialism.
Metaethics – deals with the origin, scope and meaning of ethical language and the nature of ethical theory. What do ethical terms express – are they universal or relative? Can we speak of moral progress? Are moral statements truth-apt? Is the statement ‘Abortion is wrong’ a proposition? This distinction is a critical one in moral philosophy. Moral realists say ‘yes’, anti-realists say ‘no’
To develop your own meta-ethical ideas you will need to see where you stand in relation to an elaborate field of philosophical positions. Here is a quick overview.
Practical ethics moves away from arcane theoretical arguments about morality to concern itself directly with the most pressing ethical issues of the day. Those we confront today include poverty, animal rights, climate change, environmental degradation, gender issues, abortion, euthanasia, diet etc.
Normative ethics is the study of moral theories that may be used to make decisions about what is right and wrong, better or worse.
To persuade other intelligent people to adopt your code of conduct you will need to justify your moral actions in clear terms. This might entail your overall moral outlook, not just arguing about a particular moral issue.
Placed in this awkward position it is soon clear that most of us think about morality in a muddled way, based on arbitrary and indistinct principles. Our morality includes a mixture of religious precepts, civil laws, and social conventions tied up with opinions that we have accepted from our parents, teachers and peers, all passed through our own moral filter. We might consider morality as the individual beliefs that we all hold, while ethics is these beliefs after they have been subjected to rational investigation.
For the sake of ethical precision, we can go to the moral philosopher for guidance on ethical theories, principles, and practices that people have adopted throughout history. This helps us understand our own moral views and how they fit (or not) into the general scheme of ethical thought.
All societies have normative rules because they assist with the smooth running of their various institutions and, of course, the particular norms accepted may differ from one society to another.
For convenience we can divide our moral lives into three broad categories:
1. The moral act itself – what it is that makes an act right or good: the investigation of ethical theories
2. The origins of moral judgments and moral intuitions – once a religious question, today this is now treated more as a scientific question involving subjects like neuroscience, evolutionary psychology, and moral psychology
3. The overall purpose, function, or goal of morality – a question traditionally addressed by philosophers
1. Moral acts
Much of the hard work of moral philosophy concerns the question of what constitutes a moral act – what is it that makes an action right or wrong, good or bad? In general terms this question has been answered by theories that concentrate on each of the three elements of the moral equation: the moral agent, the act itself, and the consequences of the act.
An example of an ethical system based on the moral actor is Aristotle‘s Virtue Ethics which focuses on the virtuous person. An example of a moral theory based on the moral act ityself would be Immanual Kant‘s Deontology which focuses on the rules that prompt the moral act (the categorical imperative – Act on a principle or maxim that you can will to be a universal law). Then, theories based on the consequences of moral acts are referred to as consequentialism, one form of which is utilitarianism.
In the Western tradition these three types of theories – Virtue Ethics, Deontology, and Consequentialism – constitute the major approaches to ethics so we need to look at them in more detail.
The foundations of Western ethics were laid down by the ancient Greek philosophers in the Axial Age. They regarded morality as the search for the highest human good, known as eudaimonia (eu-true, daimonia-spirit). Eudaimonia was like an ultimate human goal, it was the meaning and purpose of life . . . a self-evident human goal that did not require a law-giver or ultimate moral authority. The precise translation of the word eudaimonia is uncertain but it is roughly equivalent to what today we would call ‘happiness’, ‘well-being’, ‘human flourishing’, or ‘personal and social harmony’: it was what Aristotle regarded as the full actualization of human potential. Though the general goal of eudaimonia was uncontroversial, the means of achieving it was a matter for keen philosophical debate.
For Plato eudaimonia could be achieved by living ‘The Good Life’ (see Reason) which was a just life attained when the three components of the mind – reason, spirit and appetite (what today we might loosely call ‘head’, ‘heart’ and ‘gut’) – were in harmony, with reason in control. This harmony could only be achieved within a just society, which is what he outlined in his book The Republic (see reason). Moral character (arête, virtue or excellence) was critical and different philosophers had their preferred virtues. Especially popular were the cardinal ‘inner’ virtues of wisdom, justice, temperance and courage, although ‘outer’ factors like relationships, social peace, physical beauty, and money were also included.
For Aristotle the path to eudaimonia consisted of virtue informed by reason (‘doing the right thing for the right reason‘) and he outlined his ideas in the monumental Nicomachean Ethics. He regarded virtue as the moderation of extremes with pleasure and happiness not ultimate goals but by-products of the virtuous life. Aristotle, like most of the other Greek philosophers, regarded reason as a key ingredient of eudaimonia. Humans were the only rational animals and virtue was ‘right behaviour habituated’ a precept still observed today as a key aspect of parenthood and education.
The word ‘ethics’ derives from the Greek ethos – habit or custom. For Aristotle everything had a purpose or telos and for humans the good life would be fulfil that telos: we would express this in a general way as achieving our maximum potential given life’s various constraints. Guidance in virtuous behaviour could be given by virtuous individuals. Aristotle believed in strength of character. The philosopher Epicurus in contrast maintained that virtue was on the path to the greatest goal of eudaimonia which was happiness or pleasure (for Epicurus pleasure was not self-indulgence but freedom from pain, fear, and distress).
Plato thought that reason was part of the transcendental world of forms or ideas, while for Aristotle reason was the means by which humans could achieve their highest function or purpose, which he called telos): reason was a mechanism for achieving maximum human potential given the constraints of human nature. Reason, then, was needed for the development of good habits, something which we all have capacity for, but something which needs ‘training’. Reason was therefore the tool we use to regulate individual and socially destructive behaviour, to relieve suffering, resolve conflict, assign praise and blame as punishment and reward, and increase freedoms.
Aristotle’s virtue ethics, after a period in the doldrums, is now finding renewed support. However, virtues are slippery concepts that can vary with time and place. This makes it difficult to regard virtue ethics as a comprehensive normative theory since deciding what constitutes a virtue requires us to first know what we ought to do.
To decide what we ought to do ethicists turn to two pre-eminent ethical theories: deontology (which concentrates on intentions and the following of rules), and consequentialism (assessment of the consequences of our actions).
Deontology (the Golden Rule)
David Hume had claimed that reason alone could not motivate action, ethical behaviour was a product of the will and that all we could hope for in our moral lives is ‘a stable and general perspective‘. Kant agreed with Hume that intuition, not reason, was the motivator for behaviour but if behaviour was to be moral then reason must be the agent that makes it so. Reason is the moral guide but it is not always in control. Plato likened this to the charioteer trying to control his horses.
Deontologists (Greek deon-obligation, necessity) in the tradition of German philosopher Immanuel Kant maintain that certain actions, like lying, cheating, and being loyal are simply right or wrong.
One widely acknowledged moral precept is the Golden Rule, sometimes called the ‘principle of impartiality’, expressed as some version of the sentiments ‘Do as you would be done by‘. It makes the point that there is no intrinsic reason why any person should be morally privileged over any another. This principle is a keystone of world religions; it has also been endorsed in various forms by many great thinkers. There is Spinoza’s Viewpoint of Eternity, Kant’s Categorical Imperative, Hobbes and Rousseau’s Social Contract, Locke and Jefferson’s self-evident truth (that all men are created equal), Adam Smith’s ‘impartial spectator’, modern philosopher John Rawls’s ‘veil of ignorance‘ (suggesting social contracts be tested by asking people to agree to them when they have no idea of the consequences of the contract for themselves), and moral philosopher Henry Sidgwick’s ‘The Point of View of the Universe’.
The Golden Rule appeals to reason, inviting us to look beyond our own self-interest by pointing out that it is not fair to privilege oneself over others: it is the rational advocacy of a rule that is easily understood. Though clearly a valuable guiding principle in life, it has a simple flaw. People are different: you might not want the same things that I want, so universalizing your, or my, morality will not always work – but we get the general idea. Nevertheless, this is morality based on reason, telling us that it is logically inconsistent to apply a moral principle only to ourselves.
Deontology is in many ways an ethic of duty. For many people the dogmatism of deontology is unacceptable since we can think of many exceptions to its rules. And yet we do tend to follow general rules of behaviour in a deontological way albeit in an undisciplined manner.
Consequentialist ethics, being concerned with ends, is also known as teleological ethics. The most popular strand of consequentialism today is utilitarian consequentialism (the greatest happiness for the greatest number) made famous through the writing of Jeremy Bentham and John Stuart Mill. It maintains that although moral acts are carried out for many proximate (immediate) reasons the ultimate guiding principle is the maximization of pleasure (Hedonistic utilitarianism) or happiness (which entails the minimization of pain and suffering).
Bentham’s contention that pleasure and pain underlie our moral behaviour was pre-dated by over 2000 years in the philosophical ideas of Epicurus of Samos, Epicureanism and utilitarianism being in essential character the same. However, consequentialism, especially utilitarianism, is enjoying a period of popularity, probably because it avoids the dogmatism of deontology whose rules seem to have many exceptions.
Utilitarianism, sometimes characterized as a means of maximizing welfare through a kind of societal cost-benefit analysis, was given its most rigorous expression through the work of Cambridge philosopher Henry Sidgwick.
Criticisms of utilitarianism take various forms: is its goal average or total happiness for the greatest number; we can think of acts that seem ‘right’ but which do not support the maxim and others that seem ‘wrong’ but which do support the maxim; we feel ambivalent about committing extreme acts that are generally regarded as wrong in deference to greater happiness; there is a lack of clarity concerning the definition of happiness itself; does utilitarianism apply to just humans or all sentient beings?
Utilitarianism may clash with our moral intuitions, and it can be extremely demanding if rigidly adhered to. Just as deontology seems to present us with exceptions, so the kind of ‘moral calculus’ that consequentialism entails, weighing up the ‘fors’ and ‘againsts’ in any situation as units of pleasure (‘hedons’) is problematic and can present us with either impossible choices or impossible decision-making complexity. For example, if donating your organs right now could save five lives should you make this sacrifice? Doesn’t the maximization of benefit demand that you should? Utilitarians promote the universal moral precept of the greatest net benefit in relation to ‘ends’ (perhaps tell a lie under circumstances that leads to overall benefit), while deontologists use universal principles based on means (never lie).
Utilitarianism comes in several flavours. Hedonistic utilitarianism holds that we should always do what will maximize pleasure, or happiness, and minimize pain, or unhappiness. Act utilitarianism concerns itself with the morality of individual or ‘token’ acts while rule utilitarianism concerns itself in a more general way with similar kinds of moral action. Preference utilitarianism defers to the common good and our tendency to privilege our own interests, maintaining that ‘On balance we should do what furthers the interests of those affected’. This fulfills the criterion of universalizability (the Golden Rule of ‘do as you would be done by‘) which has proved so popular among philosophers and religious traditions throughout history.
Utilitarianism for all its difficulties is a practical moral theory that is relatively free of academic jargon and complication: it is a moral theory that, for better or worse, has captured the spirit of our times.
It must be acknowledged that the search for an overarching moral theory that is logically coherent and satisfying has proved elusive.
To (over)simplify current thinking we can frame a key question about morality today in the following way: ‘Do we act morally in consideration of the consequences of our actions or because of inviolable rules? That is, are we consequentialists (utilitarians) or deontologists, or some combination of the two?’
In answering this question for ourselves we must bear in mind that these two theories are not necessarily mutually exclusive so, for example, many consequentialists accept the value of general guiding moral principles. Both Virtue Ethics and Consequentialism confront their own difficulties so it is common for people to have ‘mixed’ views.
The Preference Utilitarian position of practical ethicist Peter Singer and his transition to a Hedonistic Utilitarian stance is a good example of an attempt to forge an explicit moral view that is open to criticism and correction.
2. The origin of moral judgments & intuitions
Morality, as commonly understood, is a human activity addressing human interests. Reason is used to examine the totality of human interests and make suggestions for the way these interests, in both individuals and communities, can be best satisfied.
Expressed this way it is easy to see how many ethical issues concern various forms of social justice.
Outside & inside – the organism-environment continuum
We may view morality from a broad biological perspective as an important aspect of the interaction between an organism and its environment. In crude general terms, it is one aspect of the feedback process of natural selection – of ‘self-correction’ in relation to surroundings. So, in this sense it is the consequence of the interaction between the organism, as semi-autonomous living and evolving matter, and its environment. For humans, this interaction with the environment is moderated by reason as a behavioural filter, a crucial element of the ‘self-correction’.
Our inclination is to regard morality as imposed on us from ‘outside’ ourselves – by our parents, civil law, divine law and so on.
Religion aside, ultimately morality must come to us from ‘inside’ as either a feeling of what is right and wrong resulting from our free will, the result of accumulated personal experience, or what we might call a moral intuition, or maybe the result of considered deliberation as the use of our reason.
The question of internal and/or external sources and determinants is reminiscent of the nature vs nurture debate and we will return to this later. However, if morality is generated, at least in part, from within us then ethical questions become less to do with philosophy and more to do with biology, more specifically moral psychology (the nature of moral intuition) and the behavioural sciences. The ‘inner/outer’ dichotomy also brings to mind the question of subjectivity and objectivity. Perhaps we think of our behaviour as the result of rational consideration with reason playing a key role: after all we often intuitively regard ‘wrong’ behaviour as irrational.
Cambridge University moral philosopher Henry Sidgwick regarded ethics as ‘any rational procedure for determining what we ought to do‘. Indeed there are grounds for suggesting that morality be defined as the subjugation of our natural inclinations and impulses to reason. On this point philosophers and scientists are undecided. Whether rationality is the primary source of our moral decision-making remains one of the most challenging current questions in ethics and cognitive science.
Biologically it would appear that whatever goes on in our minds when making moral decisions that mental activity is generated as a consequence of interaction with the environment: it is part of the adaptive interaction between organism and environment.
Biology & evolution
Living organisms are ‘primed’ by evolution (their genetic makeup) to survive, reproduce, and flourish. This is regarded by biologists as their meaning and purpose. As humans we desire to not only survive and reproduce but to flourish, to be ‘happy’, which may also be regarded as part of our meaning and purpose.
Modern research takes the question of origins back a further step. If indeed reason and emotion are mainsprings of our ethical decisions then how do we account for these traits in scientific and evolutionary terms. Can evolution inform our attitudes to morality? Clearly emotions play a major role in our behaviour as various desires and emotions pull us in different directions. To what extent is our behaviour selfish or egoistic and to what extent altruistic? How do all these factors fit in with the external world which includes other people? Sometimes not very well. So what is the factor that corrects or controls these inner forces, that allows us to self-correct and therefore continue to survive, reproduce and flourish?
Non-adaptive moral behaviour will be weeded out by natural selection but self-correcting reason provides us with a short-cut. Moral psychologists have isolated a commonality of moral intuition across cultures suggesting an innate source of our moral behaviour whether it be the ‘five foundational domains’ or reason and variations of the Golden Rule (see later).
The five foundational domains are regarded by moral psychologist Jonathan Haidt as the mainspring of moral behaviour in all humans. They are the innate factors motivating us in our moral decision-making and are considered in more detail in the article on moral psychology. These ‘moral intuitions’ can be listed briefly here as: care/harm, fairness/cheating (reciprocity, altruism, empathy, cooperation, free-riding), loyalty/betrayal, sanctity/degradation, authority/subversion (hierarchy, respect, dignity, honour).
Reason & intuition
Reason is a logical device that, on its own, we might believe, has nothing to do with morality. Bare reason can never be the ‘source’ of morality, only its guide when combined with something else. So, what exactly is it that reason is working on when we make moral decisions? What are the moral intuitions and concepts that reason manipulates, and where do they come from?
Though the ancient Greek philosophers placed emphasis on the use of reason in daily life, they were fully aware of its pitfalls. Is it reason that drives our moral behaviour, or our moral intuitions (our natural instincts and inclinations, like the emotions of various kinds, that guide our behaviour)? Is an objective reason always accompanied by a desire or are desires something that is ‘added’.
Are rationally binding rules like Kant’s Categorical Imperative independent of the will as he claimed?
The question of the extent to which our moral decision-making comes from our reason or our will/passions as suggested by Hume is still debated. Certainly our will can be subjected to reason with various degrees of difficulty.
If human reason is ‘the ability to use knowledge to attain goals’ then it is our goals that are the starter-motor, the driver of reason: then reason becomes the servant of goals, and it has no traction without the values expressed by these goals.
Our goals are derived from our biology as the will (which, for convenience, we can define as our wants, wishes, and desires): it is therefore biological impulse that leads reason.
Further, as argued elsewhere (see biological values) human proximate minded values are grounded in the ultimate mindless biological values of survival, reproduction, and flourishing.
If this is so then, for all its trumpeted intellectual value, it appears that not only does reason have difficulty in distinguishing between good or ill, it may be used indiscriminately in the service of either. There are further potential difficulties because our individual goals may be simultaneously contradictory, they may be differ over time, and they may differ collectively both within and between cultures.
It is not irrational to follow our biologically embedded will, but the fact that the will pulls us in many directions is a strong reason to apply reason. For humans the ultimate (instinctive and long-term) goals of the biological axiom (survival and reproduction) may be overridden by proximate (conscious and short-term) goal of wellbeing manifest through our feelings of pleasure and pain, fear, hunger etc. Reason, for example, can be used to devise contraception that foils our drive to reproduce. Large parts of moral codes are devoted to counteracting our natural inclinations (e.g. Ten Commandments).
Reason dictates that within communities a guided impartiality in human interaction is the most effective form of self-interest as it promotes peaceful co-existence. Unfortunately, other biological forces may prevail. This is our fate as humans, part of the human condition, the constant battle between reason and our desires and appetites. Indeed, it makes sense to regard reason as a recent cognitive tool added by evolution as a (both mindless and mindful) way of reducing this conflict.
It is reason that can prioritize conflicting desires, guide choices, and best serve self-interest within a community: It can overcome ignorance, impulse, and powerlessness. Only reason can mindfully and consciously reflect on itself proximately, in the short-term, as a form of self-correction in the present (even though this can relate to past and future). Ultimately, it is the latest step in the mindless and unconscious self-correcting process of natural selection operating on the brain and its activity. But nature is not perfect, and we reflect its imperfections.
It is rational to do whatever we can to sharpen the tools of our reason and to investigate and overcome the cognitive impediments that are built into our human nature.
Principle – reason is driven by biological values: it is a biological tool that can over-rule but not ignore (it cannot become independent from) its biological motivation
Subjectivism & objectivism
Certainly normative laws seem different from scientific laws and evidence-based (empirical) statements of fact. Scientific laws seem to be stronger in some way. This intuition about the difference between scientific and normative laws is cleverly illustrated by the T-shirt inscribed ‘gravity is not just a good idea’.
Does this suggest that morality is ‘just a good idea‘ – a personal opinion or matter of taste? Is there really an unbridgable divide between science and ethics? When we have moral disagreements are we destined to simply agree to differ with no means of finding a ‘rational’ solution?
One way of thinking about these matters is to consider the conditions that might determine whether ethical statements are true or false. Can there be moral facts (circumstances that make a moral belief true) and if so, what is the relation between these facts and the facts of science?
Objective ethics (often referred to in ethics as cognitivism) claims that there is objective truth or falsity in moral judgments and that this truth or falsity is independent of ourselves, our culture, or nature – it does not depend upon the beliefs or feelings of any particular person or group of people, upon facts of nature. Nor does it necessarily depend on religious belief.
An axiom-like basis for morality like ‘the greatest good for the greatest number’ or ‘the maximization of human flourishing, happiness or pleasure’ seems sufficiently objective (publicly acceptable, not based on individual preference) for us to claim that moral judgments can be described as true or false. This supports our tendency to use reason to defend moral actions and provide resolution by giving the best reasons for an action when considering its effects on all concerned.
Trying to be ethically objective like this counters our tendency to privilege our personal interests. It also supports our seemingly universal moral resistance to actions like unprovoked violence, which is rarely considered a matter of subjective taste, as well as our intuitive acceptance of ‘self-evident truths’ as enunciated in the constitutions of many countries. Reason in such cases seems to point not so much to absolute truth but to the most justified or most evidence-based course of action (but more of this later).
As humans we have the mental capacity to adopt points of view that express degrees of detachment as we place ourselves, mentally, in different frames of space and time.
We might start from a position of total self-interest – with the immediacy, intensity, and urgency of our own individual existence right here, and right now. This is moderated somewhat as we consider the point of view of people around us, acknowledging that they have their own lives, interests, and concerns in time-frames that extend, both spatially and temporally, beyond our own. My egoistic focus diminishes further when I consider my place in relation to the ebb and flow of the customs and traditions of different human cultures; then the significance of my existence in terms of the history of the entire community of life. Finally, there is the total insignificance of my life on a small blue dot in the infinity of space and time as I adopt the total detachment and indifference that is the point of view of the universe.
Such a characterization is a confrontation with perspective and what ‘matters’ as the sense of value diminishes.
Total detachment removes all value. For substance that is defined by its value-driven agency this draws attention to the relative insignificance, absurdity, indifference, and meaninglessness of the inanimate.
What ‘matters’ can only be relevant to substance with agency that can be enhanced or thwarted . . . that is, all life with the biologically given (objective) values of survival, reproduction, and flourishing.
Human conscious deliberation (capacity for reason) evolved out of this mindless agency as an adaptation that serves the same evolutionary ends: human values are grounded in biological values.
The human reason used in moral judgment is a thick concept (it is both descriptive and evaluative). If reason is the ‘ability to use knowledge to attain goals‘ then the universality that arises from its ‘ought’ is not derived from logic, or mathematics – the point of view of the universe – but from the universal values of the biological axiom. The biological axiom is itself a thick expression, it is both a factual description of the way organisms are, and an evaluation as behavioural orientation. Reason based on the point of view of the universe is a denial of life.
Does this insight help us – can it guide humanity in some way?
The way we are, suggests we adopt a maximum possible accommodating stance in relation to our fellows, the community of life, and the environment on which biological agency depends. We do this, not because we ought to do it, but because as rational creatures this is the way we are in time and space now. Reason based on biological values can take us down many paths that include conflict and confusion.
Subjective ethics (relativism)
Subjective ethics, by contrast, can takes various forms:
Emotivism, sometimes called the ‘boo-hooray theory’, claims that morality is just an expression of our emotions. Expressivism claims that moral statements are not about facts but about attitudes. In such cases it becomes extremely difficult to claim that moral progress is possible.
The truth and falsity of judgments made by the different schools of thought is sometimes expressed in terms of cognitivists and non-cognitivists:
Non-cognitivists claim that moral judgments do not state anything that we can know. We cannot make ethical statements that can be judged as true or false, such statements simply express feelings or attitudes, prescribe certain actions, or attempt to sway others to a particular point of view.
Cognitivists claim that moral statements present the truth about our obligations and our reasons for action.
However, a cognitivist subjectivist may claim that moral statements can be true or false while not applying to everyone (they may, for example, depend on the attitude of the speaker or a particular culture)
While a cognitivist objectivist claims universal truth or falsity of moral statements.
Subjectivism was popular for much of the 20th century and is still supported by some philosophers although the idea that ethics has a rational basis is gathering popularity.
If you find subjectivism unconvincing then it can be expressed in a more moderate way by claiming that morality is culturally embedded: it is not necessarily a matter of individual taste but more a result of cultural tradition.
The issue of subjective and objective ethics becomes less academic and more a matter of practical ethics when we consider culturally conflicting moralities, whether based in religion, cultural tradition or custom.
Subjectivism tends to adopt a position of tolerance as cultural relativists are cognitivist subjectivists: the truth of a moral statement being relative to its cultural context. This is expressed through sayings like ‘live and let live’ and ‘when in Rome do as the Romans do’. So, for example, expressing disapproval over ethical differences between cultures would not be considered appropriate behaviour. But there are some difficulties with this approach.
Cultural relativism is resistant to moral change as it is usually based on numbers (majority opinion) in any particular circumstance. It also presents the quandary of supporting, say, slavery, racial oppression, genital mutilation, and extreme cruelty as different but equally valid modes of behaviour.
For the objectivist, extreme cases like those just listed above are ‘objectively’ undesirable and therefore demonstrate not only that morality is not relative, but that we are entitled to make evaluative claims about different moral systems. How we express this moral disapproval is clearly a moral dilemma in itself.
3. The purpose of morality?
Can there be a single purpose for all ethics, an ultimate goal – a goal that is an end in itself and which does not depend on some further goals – a goal that is universal and therefore objective?
There are multiple candidates for this role. Moral philosopher Henry Sidgwick suggested ‘justice’, ‘benevolence’ and ‘prudence’ as self-evident or rationally intuitive ‘axioms’ on which ethics could be based. Many philosophers have suggested that a prime candidate for this ultimate principle is ‘happiness’. However, making justice and honesty absolute principles is difficult because we might find exceptions involving consequences that we cannot accept (e.g. the ‘white lie’).
The ideas of many philosophers seem to have coalesced around the old Epicurean notion of ‘universal happiness‘ (as pleasure and freedom from pain – the greatest happiness for the greatest number, or some variant of these sentiments) as a single categorical (universal) duty – this being the moral position called ‘utilitarianism’.
But what could be more natural than rational self-interest? Shouldn’t this be taken as a fundamental, even obligatory, axiom of morality?
In general, making other people happy makes us happy ourselves . . . but not always. What ought we to do in these difficult cases when there is a clash between our own happiness (egoistic hedonism) and the happiness of all (universalist hedonism)?
While this is certainly a reasonable position the universalization of rules constantly moderates our natural self-centeredness by abstracting to the realization that the good of any one individual is of no more importance than the good of another. A utilitarian would claim that although we have strong and motivating self-interest, when one act impartially creates the greater happiness then this is what we should try to achieve.
Metaethics is the study of the discipline of ethics itself, including its scope and the nature of ethical properties, statements, and attitudes, including the possibility of moral progress. It also addresses the broader question ‘Why should I do what I do – what is my justification?’.
One major topic within metaethics deals with the meaning of ethical language. Can we say that moral statements are ‘true’ or ‘false’?
When we say ‘stealing is wrong’, is this some kind of factual proposition or something rather different? That is, are moral statements truth-apt?
Those that say ‘no’ – that all moral statements are false – support Error Theory (J.L. Mackie) which claims that rightness and wrongness are not objective features of the world, they simply don’t exist – they just take on the character of descriptive statements.
Those that say ‘yes’ must ask if moral properties are objective properties of the world.
Those who say that moral statements can be true or false are moral realists, those who believe sone other distinction is more appropriate are anti-realists.
Moral realism (cognitivism, objectivism)
The moral objectivist claims that moral statements are propositions about objective facts in the world and, as such, they are descriptive and can be true or false.
Those that say ‘no’ (disagree) are claiming subjectivism (relativism). Individual subjectivism means e.g. ‘I disapprove of abortion’ so the truth of moral statements is relative to the individual, while cultural subjectivism (cultural relativism) they refer to the culture as a whole (it is important here to distinguish between descriptive relativism and metaethical relativism: it is a fact that different cultures have different moral systems but this does not mean that nobody is objectively right or wrong).
Those that say ‘yes’ are moral realists, they claim that some moral statements are objectively true e.g. abortion has the mind-independent property of wrongness, it is a descriptive feature of the world.
There is then the question of whether moral properties are ‘natural’ (empirical or scientific) such that moral goodness is, for example, pleasure as an intrinsic good.
Moral naturalism (e.g. Sam Harris The Moral Landscape) therefore regards moral properties as natural properties. Such a view has appeal because, by this understanding, morality can truly become a science. If ‘the good’ is synonymous with, say, wellbeing, flourishing, health, knowledge it becomes an empirical property of the world e.g. ‘pain is bad’. This is sometimes referred to as Natural Law.
Biologists, especially, might be attracted by the idea that enquiry into the natural world can increase moral knowledge in step with scientific knowledge. But can ethics be confirmed by science? Can moral facts be facts of nature?
But, it may be argued by the moral non-naturalist, whatever facts we choose to represent ‘the good’ in Natural Law, these cannot convincingly bring value with them. We might say that pain is bad, but it does not follow that therefore we ‘ought’ to avoid pain. On this understanding moral realism becomes a form of intuitionism. It is a characteristic of moral language that it expresses non-natural states of affairs.
Moral realists like Singer and De Lazari-Radek (following Sidgwick) justify reason as the source of objective morality by claiming that reason can provide us with self-evident rules that ‘lead us cogently to trustworthy conclusions‘ that are ‘mutually consistent‘ and that we can ‘. . . clearly and distinctly apprehend to be true‘ so that there can be ‘ . . . no conflict between two intuitions‘.
Like any claim to resolve ethical dispute this is tantalizingly attractive. But just as such realist philosophers might disclaim Natural Law proponents by pointing out that facts cannot imply values; so it might equally be pointed out that reason can never divest itself entirely of value. There is no such thing as morality viewed from the point of view of the universe. Moralities bear the imprint of life because they arise out of life – not out of inanimate matter.
Moral anti-realism (non-cognitivism)
Moral statements are not truth apt: they are statements about value, they are not descriptive, and not objective. (non-cognitivism, subjectivism) claims that value, right and wrong, are matters of personal choice giving morality flexibility such that moral propositions are not truth-appropriate, matters of value.
Anti-realism takes three main forms:
– emotivism (moral propositions are expressions of emotion, the ‘boo-hoorah’ theory associated with Ayer & Stevenson)
– prescriptivism (moral propositions are not descriptions but moral imperatives: they are prescriptions or recommendations)
– quasi realism (moral factionalism associated with Simon Blackburn) that, for practical convenience we behave as though moral statements are true or false even though, in fact, moral properties are not real.
It is important to distinguish between emotivism and individual subjectivism. Individual subjectivism reports a moral view describing something that can be true or false, while emotivism does not report anything other than an emotional reaction.
Moral realism (cognitivism, objectivism) claims that value, right and wrong, actually exist in the world so moral propositions can be true or false since they reflect matters of fact. Moral realism is of two kinds: ethical naturalism (naturalistic ethics) which claims that we have empirical knowledge of moral properties and that these are reducible to non-moral terms and properties – like needs, wants, or pleasures (rather than, say, the will of God), and ethical non-naturalism – which claims that ethical sentences are propositions, some empirically true, but not reducible to non-moral features.
Divine Command Theory
The world’s most prevalent anti-realism is expressed as Divine Command Theory.
For most of human history morality has been regarded as simply a set of rules or code of behaviour issuing from god(s) by divine decree.
Since the advent of writing this divine code has been communicated through holy scripture. Perhaps the best-known examples in the West would be the Old Testament Ten Commandments of the Christian and Jewish faiths issued by God to Moses who wrote them down on stone tablets (hence ‘written in stone’) before presenting them to his people. Islam has Five Pillars while other religions have similar codes originating from a divine or inspired leader.
Ethical systems have traditionally been deeply embedded in religious belief and still are, as the majority of people on the planet are religious believers. There is a straightforward simplicity about this non-negotiable absolute set of rules as it clearly serves two major social functions. Firstly it reduces the possibility of challenge to human frailty and fallibility and, secondly, it provides the behavioural rules and aspirations that are necessary to hold societies together. Religious conviction has led many to question the basis of any morality that is not the consequence of divine decree: if God does not exist then why should we behave in a moral way? The simple answer to this problem is that we behave morally because life is better that way. Indeed, we can ask in reply: do we really only behave in a moral way for fear of what God, or society, might do to us?
God’s law, or will, is problematic in several ways. Apart from all faith being entailing belief without sound reason there is the difficulty of imagining how anyone could do anything that was contrary to the will of an omnipotent god and if God’s will prevails everywhere in the universe then God becomes an unnecessary component of moral discourse. Of course it may be claimed that God has given humans free will as an ultimately greater good. But if this is so then the atrocities, pain and suffering of the world seem hard to justify on these grounds. In addition, discovering God’s will entails the dubious business of interpreting the sacred texts. Plato pointed out that when God issued a divine decree like ‘Do not kill’ we are entitled to ask if he did this for a reason. If he did not have a reason then he might equally have said ‘Killing is good’. If you find the statement that ‘Killing is good’ distasteful or you believe that god would not have said this then, either way, your attention will focus on the reason without concern for the intermediary of God.
Regardless of arguments like these that put God to one side, theists tend to claim that just as we must use our reason to discover the wonder of Gods creation (natural theology) so we must also use reason to discover God’s will (morality). We might call this approach a kind of secular empiricism: it does not necessarily deny God but uses reason and evidence as its investigatory tool for drilling into morality.
Taking a moral position
Passing our ideas through the ethicist’s filter described above can help us understand the moral thinking and behaviour of both ourselves and others.
Here is my self-analysis . . . perhaps, like me, you will find there are many ‘ifs’ and ‘buts’.
First, a statement of prior commitment. The articles on this web site describe my beliefs about the origins and influences motivating human behaviour (the physical expression of our values and ethical beliefs). These, I claim, are of two major kinds: those that originate from our biological nature or agency (these biological values are biologically necessary in the sense that to deny them does not make biological sense); and those that derive from our minded human agency (behaviour resulting on the one hand from our unconscious desires and inclinations, on the other, from our conscious deliberation – our use of reason).
We must consider that, in any moral judgment, the latter (minded subjective judgments, both unconscious and, to a lesser extent, conscious judgments) are informed by the former (objective biological values).
This claim is supported by the fact that the kind of reason that is deployed in ethical judgments is a thick concept – it is not detached from existence like the axioms of mathematics, or the internal relations of logic – it is motivated by objective biological values (sometimes called the ‘passions’, or the ‘will’).
Are moral statements truth-apt?
Can ethical judgments be objective truths that we can know by reason (objectivism, moral realism, non-cognitivism)?
To answer this question I need to be clear about, at least, what I mean by ‘ethics’, ‘objective’, ‘truth’, and ‘reason’.
By ethics I mean judgments about right, wrong, good, what we ought to do etc., not value judgments as objective personal preferences. At this stage a statement like ‘it is wrong to steal’ seems problematic because it takes an uncompromising (absolute or universal) stance on stealing, when there are clearly many exceptions – this alone is sufficient for me to take a non-cognitivist (subjectivist, non-realist) position. However, the degree of influence exerted by objective biological values will depend on the particular case.
It is already clear that ethical judgments can have both factual and subjective content and that this initial distinction is therefore invalid. In the case of stealing a first impression would be that biological values play little part, so emphasis is on subjective properties.
How and why does morality change? Does it make sense to speak of moral progress?
If morality is subjective then not only is there little incentive to change current practices, but the whole idea of moral progress appears meaningless because no form of behaviour can be regarded as an advance or improvement on any other.
We certainly feel intuitively that moral circumstances can be improved. Steven Pinker in an examination of human violence throughout history, The Better Angels of Our Nature: the Decline of Violence in History and its Causes (2011) presents compelling evidence for steady, if briefly fluctuating, decrease of human violence over time. Faced with an endless stream of negative and violent news this might seem counterintuitive (this is a framing issue (see Reason). However, only a few hundred years ago in Europe the public disembowelling of some unfortunate person was treated as family entertainment.
Evidence for moral progress includes the world-wide abolition of slavery, a decrease in racial prejudice, the decriminalization of homosexuality, the improved treatment of women, and a reduction in both capital and corporal punishment. Further, the rate of moral progress is probably increasing. Since 1950 we can list the advent of feminism, the human rights movement, animal liberation, removal of smoking from public places, and the launch of gay rights. Children today on average live in a much more peaceable family and school environments in spite of horrendous lapses such as pathological shootings.
‘Police are such judgmental people’
We have also become less judgmental and more cautious in the way we express our morality – we have become more ‘politically correct’.
Many behaviors have changed from being perceived as moral failings to becoming lifestyle choices. These include: divorce, illegitimacy, being a working mother, marijuana use, and homosexuality.
One-time moral laxity is now often treated as misfortune as ‘tramps’ or ‘bums’ become the ‘homeless’. Syphilis, once widely known under a range of pejorative terms is now a ‘sexually transmitted disease’ . . . and so on.
How do we account for moral progress; how has it been achieved?
Massive change over such a short time period indicates that this cannot be a genetic change in human nature. How did the once universal capital punishment become virtually eliminated in the face of the logic of ‘an eye for an eye’?
Steven Pinker suggests that moral transitions occur by means of a ‘norm cascade’. When a controversy arises intellectual elites (the educated and articulate) defy the majority based on rational arguments. This tends to be pushed through a process of formalization. The change is then observed to have little if any negative effects and becomes accepted as a norm such that reversing the decision becomes not only unlikely but absurd. Radical opponents then serve to cement the newly established norms. Pinker also suggests an Escalator of Reason : that, over time, there has been an ‘intensifying application of knowledge and rationality to human affairs‘ which ‘can force people to recognize the futility of cycles of violence, to ramp down the privileging of their own interests over others’s, and to reframe violence as a problem to be solved rather than a contest to be won. In other words it is reason that is at the vanguard of humanitarian reform.’ Slowly, over the course of history, we have seen the ascendancy of reason over impulse, while recognising that it is within our nature to revert at any time.
Pinker suggests that cosmopolitanism encourages thinking in more abstract universal terms which counters the tendency to adopt local parochial and inflexible thoughts and attitudes. Support for this idea comes from the ‘Flynn effect’ whereby teenager IQs have actually increased since the test was devised as a result, according to researcher Flynn, of a more critical scientific mode of thought transmitted through our culture.
Commentary & sustainability analysis
Today we live in a highly integrated and globalised world of interdependencies where science and technology dominate most of 7 billion human lives in a way that the Greek philosophers could not possibly have imagined. But their question ‘How are we to live harmonious and flourishing lives?‘ is more pressing and relevant than it ever was in the past: it is still the fundamental question of morality and human existence. Does it make sense to speak of an ultimate end or final human purpose (telos) – that to which all humans aim: the attempt to achieve our maximum potential as human beings?
Philosophers and scientists find it advantageous to view the world as objectively as possible because we know that our human subjectivity can interfere with the way we interpret the way the world is. So, we try to see things from, as it were, ‘the point of view of the universe’. From this perspective, with subjectivity removed, the universe just ‘is’. The universe does not have values because values are added by human minds. No ‘ought’ (no values) can derive from the existence of a chair because a chair just ‘is’. Viewed from this detached vantage point humans too just ‘are’ because they, like chairs, are just objects of the universe. Any purpose or value, in such a world, is a consequence of human subjectivity.
But humans, and indeed all living organisms, clearly have ‘interests’ in a way that a chair does not. All life is founded on the assumption of survival and reproduction as an ultimate end. For self-aware deliberating humans this translates into the consciousness categories of happiness, wellbeing, and flourishing. Normative consequences flow from the fact of our living existence unless, of course, we wish to deny our humanity and to become an object in the universe with the same metaphysical quality as a chair. To claim that the fact of life has no implications of value is a philosophical indulgence.
This view of ethics founded on our biological nature is referred to as biological normativity. Since consequentialism in its most popular form as utilitarianism is based on the premise of ‘the greatest happiness for the greatest number’ then consequentialism (unlike deontology or divine command theory) rests on an assumption of biological normativity.
The introduction to this article posed the possibility of a universal and objective moral code that would apply to the community of life, future generations, and the planet. For ethicists the prospect of moral concern for non-sentient objects, like the planet, is bordering on the absurd for a subject that has been confined almost exclusively to humans. We do not include rocks and rivers within our moral sphere because they cannot have interests and concerns and they do not feel pleasure and pain. And yet if we do not care about these things then human flourishing is threatened. Climate change is a good example. Should we care about the quantity of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere to the extent that we feel morally obliged to do something about it? The answer must be ‘yes’.
From the ancient Greeks to the utilitarians of today philosophers have suggested that from the many, often trivial, reasons for our many moral decisions and behaviour we can discerned a broad overall or ultimate goal. Though such an all-embracing goal may be ill-defined it can be uncontroversial and therefore acceptable. The ancient Greeks called this overall goal eudaimonia, for Plato this was a kind of harmony within individuals as they cooperated together within a harmonious society. Aristotle saw the goal for individuals as achieving their maximum human potential given their own particular circumstances. Today we use a wide range of loosely equivalent words like ‘happiness’, ‘pleasure’, ‘the common good’, ‘well-being’, ‘human flourishing’, ‘life satisfaction’, and ‘quality of life’ which have been taken up by ethicists and social scientists as general goals for human activity. Utilitarianism, founded on the Epicurean-like ideas of pleasure and happiness and taken up by Jeremy Bentham, John Stuart Mill, Henry Sidgwick and influential today through the work of Australian philosopher and practical ethicist Peter Singer. Just as ‘health’ is the acknowledged goal of medicine so ‘well-being’ or ‘human flourishing’ is an acceptable ultimate goal for ethics. With human flourishing as a universal goal for humanity it becomes possible, in principle, to develop an objective ethics directed towards this end. There will be those who do not desire such a goal, just as there are those that do not desire health, but these will be few and their existence does not negate the enterprise.
The article on happiness examines in closer detail what it means to be happy in terms of an ethical system and utilitarian ethics in particular. However, the use of a mental state as an ethical goal lacks clarity. The stated formal ethical goal of the international movement for sustainable development initiated by the United Nations is ‘human well-being’ similar to the traditional goals of utilitarian ethics such as ‘human flourishing’, ‘human happiness’. However, the program of international action based around this goal emphasises less the ‘internal’ mental state and more the ‘external’ economic, social and environmental management goals and conditions that are needed to guide humanity in the direction of universal well-being. The philosophy of human well-being does not conflict with existing religions and belief-systems.
What may be termed ‘sustainability utilitarianism’ recognises the congruence between the ancient Greek philosophical state of eudaimonia, the abstract utilitarian mental state of ‘happiness’, and the practical international program instigated by the United Nations to protect and improve human well-being. Sustainability utilitarianism translates the idea of happiness or well-being into a universal objective ethic whose practical program includes the well-being and integrity of the planet, the community of life, and future generations. In ethics, as in science, the inner must adapt to the outer if humans are to survive, reproduce and flourish.
Much of the study of morality has moved out of the realm of theology and philosophy (its traditional domain) into the realm of the psychological and behavioural sciences where some of the most exciting contemporary research is active in new disciplines like evolutionary psychology and moral psychology, not to mention the flood of general knowledge about the structure and function of the brain coming to us from neuroscience in general. Philosophers like Australian utilitarian Peter Singer are concerned with the moral foundations of decisions relevant to contemporary life in the relatively new discipline of practical ethics: issues like abortion, euthanasia, poverty, and genetic engineering. The traditional ancient Greek goal of ‘A Good Life’ can be made relevant to today’s world by providing a program for the well-being of the community of life through the protection of the planet and concern for future generations.
The discussion of ‘nature & nurture’ showed how organism and environment are inextricably intertwined both physically and psychologically as an organism-environment continuum. Though morality is clearly a matter of intentional mental activity we can ignore the integration and dependence of our mental activity on envirnmental factors. Debate about the source of our morality is generally framed in terms of the interaction of the two ‘inner’ (genetic) factors of moral intuition (passion, will) and reason. But this omits or significantly ignores the vital and inevitable role that must be played by the ‘external’ environment. This has a bearing on assessments of the overall purpose of morality.
If we accept the congruence of life-goals and moral goals then we can consider a number of the candidates for this most esteemed role. Plato’s ultimate goal was the ‘Good Life’ which meant harmony and happiness in both society and ourselves and requiring a just person living in a just state. The Greek word ‘eudaimonia’ was used to indicate this state of harmony or ‘human flourishing’. Utilitarians like Jeremy Bentham and John Stuart Mill, albeit in a different context, but still seeking an ultimate goal for our behaviour, produced a new set of moral objectives: ‘pleasure’ (perhaps following the precepts of Epicurus), ‘happiness’ and the ‘common good’. Today the word ‘well-being’ has become a popular portmanteau term meaning the same thing.
If we accept the applicability of the functional organism-environment continuum then it must be acknowledged that mental states like happiness and pleasure do not adequately convey the necessary and essential environmental component. The ‘common good’ does this job better. Concepts like human flourishing and well-being, though adequate, need fleshing out. What is it in the ‘environment’ that helps to produce a sense of well-being and flourishing? Biologically we can acknowledge that the goal of all life is to survive and reproduce and ‘flourishing’ is an integral part of this. Perhaps the ancient Greeks were nearest by expressing the desire for humans to be in harmony with their environment. But their emphasis was on the human environment and especially the political one.
Assuming that reason has evolved, like our bodies and minds, by natural selection then we can reasonably postulate that it will be orientated towards a single adaptive end – the survival, reproduction and flourishing of the species. We can also specify some requirements to achieve this: firstly, as complete an understanding as possible of the world that is external to our minds (a process that we have called science), and secondly, the making of decisions about our behaviour in relation to that understanding of the external world such that we are will flourish in the future (which we can call morality).
Today we know that our broader environment, the planet (not just people), is necessary for our survival and that the future of the planet’s biodiversity is in our hands. Modern science now shows that future human well-being, the common good, or eudaimonia, will depend on the condition of the planet. The purpose of morality then is the harmonious integration of humans with their environment. The word of today most closely approximating this idea is ‘sustainability’ and for this reason planet earth is now included within our moral sphere. This kind of morality is not the result of introspection and inner states like pleasurable happiness, it is based more on ‘outrospection’ or integration with the external world … not emotional empathy but cognitive empathy.
Human happiness as an ultimate value must take account the organism-environment dependency. Well-being involves more than a mental state it entails the integration of subject and object, humanity and the world. Social progress is a difficult idea since it calls into question the embedded and questionable values like those of nineteenth century colonialism a associated with moral ‘improvement’. Some common agreement may be reached by adopting a point of generality that will find near-universal acceptance. On this web site and elsewhere such a starting point can be found through the general moral notion of human flourishing or well-being. Such an idea is congruent with both the moral principles of utilitarian ethics and practical United Nations programs dealing with developing nations. The Social Progress Index (and similar indices) flesh out what is meant by human flourishing and happiness (see Morality & sustainability) using social rather than economic metrics by calculating the well-being of a society in terms of social and environmental outcomes. The social and environmental parameters include personal safety, ecosystem sustainability, health, shelter, sanitation, equity, social inclusion, personal freedom, and choice. These factors are uncontroversial and clearly take economic circumstances into account.
Human happiness or well-being as described here is therefore taken to entail a relationship between humans and their environment: that a state of harmony between the community of life and the environment cannot exist when this inter-relation is dysfunctional. That the changing human condition both directly and indirectly drives change in ecosystems and with changes in ecosystems comes change in human well-being. While also recognising that many other factors independent of the environment change the human condition,and many natural forces influence ecosystems.
The Millennium Ecosystem Assessment (2000)  provided a clear outline of the relationship between humanity and the planetary environment, pointing out how human well-being depends on natural resources or ‘ecosystem services’ and how demand on ecosystem services is rapidly increasing and sometimes outstripping capacity.
ritical to our well-being are the links between environmental management, poverty alleviation, and sustainable development. This points to the importance of consideration of biodiversity and ecosystems and the elaboration of an environmental ethic.
Scientifically we must consider organisms and their behaviour, including mental states, as a result of organism-envitronment interaction, an organism-environment continuum. This can inform the important discussion about subjective and objective ethics.Reason and evidence are the only way we’ll ever cut through the mess of conflicting gut feelings and moral intuitions. One way of viewing our behaviour is as a complex mixture of feelings, values, emotions, prejudices, desires and so on. This may be the source of our passions and will but, as Plato would probably claim, morality is the application of the moderating and taming power of reason. Indeed, we may define morality as the application of reason to appetite.)
- Our behaviour is governed by moral rules and values (norms) that impact the way we manage environmental, social and economic issues: they are therefore a vital component of sustainability management
- Metaethics deals with the foundations of the study of ethics while ethics examines the moral act, the source of our morality, and its purpose or role within society
- Two theories dominate moral philosophy today: deontology (rule-following) and consequentialism (the morality of an act depends on its consequences) although mixed views are often held
- Our attitude to morality is strongly influenced by whether we believe it to be subjective or objective
- Adoption of subjective and objective ethical positions is especially evident in cross-cultural situations
- Objective ethics makes the notion of ‘moral progress’ meaningful (possibly as a ‘norm cascade’ based on the ‘excalator of reason’) and it allows for an expanding sphere of moral commonality that can encompass other species and, some might argue, the broader environment
- The relative roles of reason and will (emotion) in moral decision-making is contentious but an appeal to reason is evident in the cross-cultural and religious idea of the Golden Rule
- Utilitarians regard the ultimate purpose of morality (its ultimate value) as universal happiness or human flourishing then this can only occur when humans exist in a harmonious relationship with the environment and this is why animals, plants, rivers and mountains are an integral part of the moral sphere
- Ancient Greek philosophers referred to human harmony or flourishing, the ultimate value of life, as eudaimonia
- The modern word for the harmonious integration of human consciousness with the external world (planet Earth) is ‘sustainability’
- summary of claims that are argued in more detail in the articles what is life?, purpose, biological agency, human-talk, being like-minded, biological values, and morality -
It is argued on this web site that science is best served when we recognize that there is biological agency in the goal-directed behaviour of all living organisms and that human minded agency is a highly evolved form of biological agency. Also, that agency, purpose, and value are more scientifically coherent concepts when considered as part of the real fabric of life, not creations of the human mind.
The brief points below constitute a defense of agential realism, bioteleological realism, and biological normativity (moral naturalism). They outline: the key characteristics of life; how mindless purpose, agency, and normativity are possible; how to discriminate between the minded and mindless in both language and the world; the relationship between biological normativity and human ethics; and why it is scientifically more appropriate to treat organisms as real agents rather than being agent-like.
Biology is the study of life - as viewed from many perspectives and on many scales. The organism is the basic physical unit of life, and the species is the basic unit of biological classification.
Organisms are autonomous biological agents that share a unity of purpose, the goal-directed activity of the biological axiom (see below).
The goal-directed behaviour of organisms is an objective fact. Organisms behave in an integrated, unified, and purposeful way that tends to preserve and further their existence. This unity of purpose is the temporary agential propensity to survive, reproduce, and flourish (the biological axiom).
It is this agency that distinguishes the matter of living organisms from the matter of the inanimate and dead.
The biological axiom
The biological axiom - that life is predicated on the temporary survival, reproduction, and flourishing of organisms as autonomous agents - is our most economical scientific statement of biological purpose. It provides the universal, objective, and ultimate goal-directed preconditions for life, referred to here as biological agency. These goals are: temporary because death is a precondition for life: all organisms die; universal because they are expressed by all living organisms; objective because they are a mind-independent empirical fact; and ultimate because they are a summation and unification of all proximate goals, including those of minded organisms.
As a universal and ultimate objective statement of biological agency the biological axiom is a grounding statement for all biological agency, purpose, intention, and normativity, including minded human agency. It is a statement about the way all organisms, including humans, are, and what they do.
As a universal statement about living organisms, the biological axiom is a declaration of the necessary and sufficient conditions for life - the conditions that are a biological necessity.
Mindless living organisms have the autonomous capacity to discriminate between the objects and processes of their inner and outer environments, adapting to these circumstances with a goal-directed unity of purpose. This behavioural flexibility, as constrained by the objectives of the biological axiom, expresses the biological agency that is at the heart of biological science and its explanations of the natural world. And it is out of this mindless behavioural flexibility and agential autonomy that our minded human conscious capacity to discriminate between 'self' and 'other' evolved.
Parts of organisms do not have goals in the same way that autonomous organisms have goals. It is helpful to distinguish between the purposes, interests, and goals of autonomous organisms and the functions of their parts (structures, processes, and behaviours) - as structures, processes and behaviours subordinate to the attainment of the organism's ultimate biological goals.
As open and dynamic agential systems, organisms regulate and integrate their flows of energy, materials, and information. In the short-term (one generation) this behaviour occurs over a lifecycle of fertilization, growth and development, maturation, reproduction, senescence, and death. Over the long term (multiple generations) organisms, as products of natural selection, display species-specific adaptive design and the potential to evolve new forms when heritable variation, transmitted to phenotypes via the chemical DNA, is subjected to environmental selection.
The emergent properties of biological agency arose in nature in a naturalistic and causally transparent way (inherited variation with feedback) that did not imply either backward causation or the intentions of either humans or gods. These agential, purposive, and normative properties of organisms preceded people in evolutionary time: they existed in nature mindlessly. That is, the notions of 'purpose', 'value', and 'agency' as described here, can refer to both minded and mind-independent conditions.
The reality of biological agency
Because the purpose, agency, and values of biological agency can only be understood by (represented in) human minds, it is often assumed that they can only exist in human minds – that they are therefore a creation of human minds. From this error of reasoning, it follows that only humans can be agents with goals, purposes, and values: that non-human organisms are, at best, only agent-like. Whereas, in fact, rather than biological goals being an invention of human minds, they are the biological substrate out of which the goals of human agency evolved.
Agency & purpose
Goal-directed behaviour is purposeful behaviour. Goal-directedness in nature is real, and without understanding the reasons for (purpose of) organismal behaviour - including its functions, structures, and processes - biological explanation becomes an incoherent listing of dissociated facts.
We ask about purposes and functions in biology precisely because organisms are agents. We do not ask what the moon or rocks are 'for', because they do not behave in a purposeful agential way.
Mindless biological purposes preceded, and gave rise to, the minded purposes we associate with human agency. That is, minded human agency evolved out of mindless biological agency. People did not create purpose and agency, it was the miraculous precision of mindless purpose and agency in nature that gave rise to people - their bodies, brains, and minds.
Biological agency & human agency
Universal biological agency and human agency are not mutually exclusive characteristics in the same way that we regard organisms with minds as distinct from those without minds. Rather, human agency is just one (human) evolutionary expression (albeit complex and minded) of biological agency. That is, uniquely human agency shares (includes) the general grounding characteristics of biological agency.
For example, we accept that sexuality exists (almost) universally across the community of life, even though it is expressed in a diversity of behaviours and physical forms. Simply because human sexuality is expressed in a uniquely human way does not mean that only human sexuality is real, and that the sexuality of other organisms is only sexual-like.
Proximate & ultimate goals
Human agency is a minded evolutionary development of mindless biological agency. Human minded goals are, in this sense, only proximate goals that serve the ultimate and mindless goals of biological agency.
So, for example, we humans eat for minded proximate ends (taste and smell stimulation and the satiation of hunger), that have the mindless ultimate biological end of survival. We have sex for minded proximate ends (orgasm, physical and emotional gratification), but also for the mindless ultimate biological end of reproduction. We develop moral and political systems seeking the minded proximate ends of happiness, wellbeing, and pleasure, while serving the ultimate and mindless biological end of flourishing.
Consider the sentence -
'The design we see in nature is only apparent design'.
We say that design in nature is ‘apparent’ (not real) because it is not human design, it is not created by human minds. But nature and organisms are replete with real designed structures in patterns more complex, beautiful, and ordered than anything created by humans. Mindless nature ‘created’ the miraculous and intricately integrated human body, including the brain that provides us with conscious representations of nature’s real design.
The problem is that, for many people, ‘design’ (and other words like ‘purpose’, ‘reason’, ‘knowledge’ and ‘value’) are minded words like ‘prefer’ or ‘believe’ - words that are used uncomfortably outside the context of the human mind. Thus, the word ‘design’ is only used nervously in relation to organisms because it implies that either they have minds, or they were created by God. So, we overcome the real design with verbal obfuscation. We say that nature is 'design-like' or 'designoid'.
But the implication that without minds design is not possible is simply, and obviously, mistaken. Our anthropocentrism simply refuses to countenance the possibility of mindless design. But, following philosopher Dan Dennett's mode of expression . . . 'purpose’, ‘reason’, 'agency', ‘knowledge’, ‘value’, 'design' (and other concepts attributed to human intention that emerged out of the evolutionary process) 'bubbled up from the bottom, not trickled down from the top'.
Biological agency created human agency: human agency did not invent biological agency as cognitive metaphor.
The language of biological agency
If biological agency is real, then how have science and philosophy persisted for so long in its denial?
Biological agency is frequently described using the language of human agency (the minded vocabulary of intentional psychology using words like 'desires', 'knows', 'wants', 'prefers' etc.). This is generally known as anthropomorphism, and it is discussed on this web site as human-talk. Since most organisms do not have minds, this language is diagnosed as being either cognitive metaphor (unreal) or, perhaps, a useful agent-like heuristic device (equally unreal). But a mistake is made when the unreality implied by the notion of a metaphor is presumed to infer the unreality of biological agency.
This presents a serious scientific dilemma. How are we to communicate the reality of biological agency (see 'technical language' below)?
The biological axiom is simultaneously a statement of biological agency, biological purpose, and biological normativity.
As a statement of biological normativity it expresses the temporary, objective, universal, and ultimate behavioural orientation of all living organisms towards survival, reproduction, and flourishing. This behavioural orientation resembles a set of generalized and mindless rules for living, like a human code of conduct, and since these goals were the evolutionary precursors to human behavioural codes they are appropriately referred to as biological normativity. But, as a mindless form of normativity, these biological values are not recommendations for behaviour, or judgements about behaviour, they are objective statements about the way organisms are.
Biological values are manifest differently in each biological agent. The physical structures, processes, and behaviours adopted by a spider to obtain its life energy, produce offspring, and flourish are very different from those of a sea urchin, eucalyptus tree, or the minded and proximate values of humans.
The mindless behaviour of the biological axiom is like (because evolutionarily related to) a human perspective or point of view. But the likeness is not the ‘as if’ similarity of metaphor but the reality of an evolutionary connection that warrants scientific recognition, since it is out of mindless biological values that human minded values evolved. This was the evolutionary precursor to human proximate minded goals that arise as both organismal biological desires and the culturally reasoned beliefs and codes that result from a critical examination of behavioural consequences. It is also why ultimate and objective biological goals can be expressed in human proximate subjective terms as the behavioural flexibility that allows organisms to exercise choices in relation to their interests.
Biological normativity and human normativity are not mutually exclusive. In behavioural terms, biological normativity is the lived expression of both unconscious (mindless) and conscious (minded) goals, where these occur. In humans they have taken on a highly evolved and minded form that includes reason.
Ethics (moral naturalism)
We often assume that judgements about what can 'help' or 'hinder' our lives, what makes a situation 'better' or 'worse', what is 'right' and 'wrong', 'good' and 'bad', are part of a human domain of subjective normative assessment that has little, if anything, to do with nature. How could it be otherwise? After all, nature itself does not think, it just is. Nature does not make moral decisions, or recommend codes of behaviour - that is nonsense. Moralities are obviously creations of human subjective deliberation, the application of what we call 'reason' as found only in human minds.
But . . .
We have inherited from nature a legacy of biological normativity as a behavioural orientation (a mindless 'code of conduct') - the behavioural goals of the biological axiom. When human minds evolved, along with their uniquely conscious and reasoning subjectivity, this universal, objective, and ultimate biological behavioural orientation was manifested in proximate minded form - in part as organismal needs, desires and intuitions, but also in part as cultural moral, and other, codes of behaviour - still grounded in ultimate biological normativity, but fine-tuned by reason. Moralities are human creations, but they are grounded in natural facts.
Aristotle's normative imperative
Biological agency expresses the 'values' (the quotes indicate an objective behavioural orientation) of survival, reproduction, and flourishing as a necessary condition for life. This is what it means to be a living organism - it is a biological necessity.
Aristotle maintained that the ultimate goals of biological agency drive us to the conclusion that – ‘It is better to exist than not exist‘, and ‘it is better to live than not live’ – referred to here as Aristotle’s biological normative imperative. Humans describe such statements as subjective value judgements that have no logical necessity. But as statements expressing the objective nature of all organisms, including humans, (but not in inanimate objects) they do express biological necessity.
Why do organisms have the propensity to survive, reproduce, and flourish? . . . ‘Because natural selection made them so‘ (Armand Leroi). Critically, and in apparent contradiction, this is not what organisms need to do, or ought to do (human subjective minded values); it is the way that they are (objective biological 'values'). It is out of these mindless values that evolution forged minded values.
Aristotle's normative imperative - the propensity of life to temporarily resist death - is an objective fact: it is not the projection of human subjective values onto life. Humans may make the minded and contestable value judgement, that 'it is good to live', but mindless organisms do not make value judgments, their biological 'normativity' is expressed in the way that they are. But humans, since they express both mindless biological agency (objective behavioural orientation) and minded human agency (subjective value) thus express both fact and value simultaneously (cf. the philosophical distinction between fact and value).
Fact & value
Our anthropocentric emphasis on the uniquely human trait of mindedness has contributed to an artificial intellectual gulf between humans and other organisms that has diminished the significance of our real biological connection. This can be attributed, in part, to the anthropocentric elevation of mindedness into a realm of values as a special mental and linguistic domain that stands in stark contrast to an unconnected realm of discourse that we call facts.
This putative difference between facts and values is widely respected within the scientific and philosophical communities. It not only sets humans apart from nature, it also separates ethics from science, and science from the humanities. But it has always been a topic of philosophical contention.
The distinction between facts and values can be addressed from the perspective of evolutionary biology.
Let us assume, reasonably, that human minded agency and its subjective values evolved out of the objective goals of the biological axiom. One simple answer to a question about the way this occurred is to say that human values arrived with human brains, thus reinforcing the fact-value distinction.
A more thorough answer would point out that both our values and ethical decisions are derived in a complex way that has both minded and mindless ingredients. Both biological and human values are established primarily through behaviour with human mindless (unconscious) behaviour including physiological responses (sweating, digesting) as well as impulses, instincts, intuitions, and other unconscious drivers emanating from the evolutionarily earlier structures of the brain. These sources are, in effect, the objective remnants of our biological agency still exerting an objective (unconscious) influence on our values, including our ethical decisions. However, human conscious values communicated by language include both unconscious and conscious elements that are moderated by our reasoning which occurs in the most recently evolved part of our brain, the frontal cortex.
We respect reason, in part, because it can substantially, but not wholly, override the influences of our mindless and unconscious biological agency.
But when we understand our subjective values from this perspective we see that they are a mixture of our inherited ancient and objective biological values (the mindless and unconscious influences on our behaviour) and the application of reason to our knowledge of these and other factors. What we call our subjective values as established by reason, include an admixture of varying quantities of objective biological value depending on circumstance. Our biology has inseparably entangled both fact and value.
Such a proposal triggers a cognitive dissonance because we both confuse (fail to distinguish between) and conflate (treat as being identical) the universal, objective, and ultimate facts of biological agency, and the uniquely human values of human agency. We fail to realize that it is possible for values to simultaneously express both similarity and difference: the shared features of biological normativity and the unique features of human agency including the use of reason with other advanced cognitive faculties.
We all (but especially intellectuals and ethicists) like to think of morality as demonstrating the supremacy of reason (morality established by pure reason), but our inclination (necessarily locked into our reason) in both politics and ethics, is to fall back on the proximate human values of maximizing happiness, wellbeing, and pleasure as influenced by the ultimate biological value of flourishing.
Biological normativity is not prescriptive in the way that moral language is prescriptive. But the faculty of reason that we proudly and rightly regard as a uniquely distinguishing feature of human agency is still grounded in biological agency and biological normativity. Though reason attempts to transcend, overcome, or be detached from biological normativity, it can only ever be partially successful. Reason itself is, of evolutionary necessity, still ultimately grounded in the biological values that give it purchase. The moral decisions that we think overcome biological normativity simply fall back on second order biological normativity.
We can and do override our biological impulses with our ethical systems (Thou shalt not kill) but the reasons I observe this moral injunction still derived from my biological normativity. Without its foundation in biological normativity, the use of reason in moral decision-making is an incoherent and empty concept.
Since reason can never fully extricate itself from biological normativity, we must face the fact that moral discourse reduces to biological facts, that human proximate and subjective valuing evolved out of ultimate and objective biological facts. The differentiation of facts and values, the descriptive and prescriptive is, at least, exaggerated. Organisms have biological values in human-like way because that is the way they (objectively) are, and that is what led to our own subjective values.
The acceptance of the reality of biological values provides us with a more compelling scientific account of nature since the assimilation of human values to biological values acknowledges the uniquely mindful properties of human values while at the same time recognizing that they evolved out of, and share major characteristics with, their mindless evolutionary antecedents.
We humans describe our own form of agency using the minded vocabulary of intentional psychology (needs, wants, desires, beliefs, preferences etc.) This is, in effect, a set of technical terms for the uniquely minded agency manifested by Homo sapiens.
Since the species Homo sapiens has its own agential vocabulary, a thoroughly objective science would develop parallel vocabularies for the unique modes of agency expressed by every other individual species – an impossible task. This is one major reason why we fall back on the use of human-talk as cognitive metaphor - simply because it is the agential language that is most familiar to us.
It is tempting to create a vocabulary of technical terms expressing, on the one hand, biological agency and, on the other, human agency, but this would be speciesism in the extreme.
But there is a further difficulty because, as already pointed out, biological agency and human agency are not mutually exclusive concepts. The proximate and uniquely minded goals of human agency evolved out of, and share characteristics with, the universal, objective, and ultimate mindless goals of biological agency.
Mindedness is not a precondition for agency in living organisms: mindedness is simply one expression of biological agency. We conflate the simple distinction between the minded and the mindless with the complex distinction between biological agency and human agency. It is not that biological agency is a subjective creation of the human mind (cognitive metaphor or heuristic), rather that the proximate and uniquely minded goals of human agency evolved out of, and share characteristics with, the universal, objective, and ultimate mindless goals of biological agency. More simply, the objective behavioural orientation of mindless organisms (mindless purpose) created minds: minds did not create purpose.
There is only one possible scientific solution - an acknowledgement that if current linguistic usage is to reflect nature, then minded concepts like 'agent', 'knowledge', 'reason', 'preference', and 'value', which are currently restricted to discourse about humans, are extended into the realm of mindless agency. This also means that what is currently regarded as metaphor is more aptly treated in literary terms (assuming literary analagies are appropriate here) as simile (see 'metaphor fallacy' below).
We frequently apply to non-human organisms the language that is usually preserved for humans. This is known as anthropomorphism, but referred to here as human-talk.
We use human-talk for many reasons including: brevity, our human cognitive bias, as an educational heuristic, and as literary flourish.
When we apply the language of human intentional psychology to mindless organisms this is not, in most cases, because we think that they experience cognitive states, but because we empathize with their biological values we intuitively acknowledge our (evolutionary) biological connection.
The use of minded language in relation to mindless organisms is a particular kind of anthropomorphism that is called cognitive metaphor, because it gifts organisms with cognitive faculties that they do not possess.
We humans have emphasized our uniquely human kind of agency by developing a uniquely minded vocabulary (we speak of needs, wants, desires, beliefs, preferences etc.) that expresses conscious intentions, sometimes called the language of intentional psychology. A thoroughly objective science would develop parallel vocabularies to describe the unique agencies of every species – an impossible task.
However, in many cases of so-called cognitive metaphor, the language is clearly intended to convey the biological likeness associated with the grounding characteristics of biological agency, not inferring that the organism has cognitive faculties. In other words, anthropomorphic language interpreted, not literally, but in terms of its intended meaning, describes a relationship between humans and non-humans that is a real likeness based on descent with modification (biological simile grounded in evolution) not cognitive metaphor grounded in a literary device. It expresses a meeting of shared biological agency, not a meeting of minds.
We say that a plant needs water, not because we think that plants experience cognitive states (human agency), but because we intuitively appreciate the significance of survival for all life (biological agency). It is not as if a plant wants water, rather, in terms of the biological agency that plants share with humans they depend on water for their survival. The agency being communicated here is not as if or even like, but the same as our human biological dependency on water. In this sense a plant needs water for exactly the same reasons that humans need water.
We say the purpose of eyes is to see, not because eyes were an intentional creation of God, or that their purpose is a projection of our own intentions, but because, from the perspective of biological agency (the objective behavioural orientation of all organisms) we understand the agential significance of sight for all organisms that have eyes. It is not as if the purpose of eyes is to see but, conversely, given the nature of biological agency, eyes have obvious and objective agential significance.
We say a spider knows how to build its web, not because we believe that spiders are consciously aware of the principles of web construction, but because we are amazed at how, without our cognitive powers, spiders instinctively build something as intricate and purposeful as a web, using information that is passed mechanically, and with meticulous precision, from one generation to the next in their genes. Even though the capacity for web building is an adaptive trait encoded in genes, rather than a cognitive attribute, it is a manifestation of biological agency that is so sophisticated that we rightly associate it with our own agency. It is not as if a spider knows how to build a web, rather, that web building (biological agency) is extraordinarily like (and biologically related to) our human cognitive capacity to learn, remember, and apply accumulated knowledge (human agency).
The denial of biological agency, purpose, and values
Scour biological textbooks, or the web, and you will find little, if anything, about biological agency, biological values, or the purpose that pervades everything in nature.
This downplaying of biological agency probably dates from a time before evolutionary theory, when each species was considered a unique and special creation with ‘ensouled’ humans biologically distinct from all the other organisms that had been placed on earth for human benefit.
The denial of real biological agency, purpose, and value rests on several interrelated confusions concerning the distinction between, on the one hand, organisms with minds and those without minds and, on the other, biological agency and human agency.
First, an inversion of reasoning. We assume that since humans are aware of their own agency (their goals, purposes, intentions, values etc.) and we know that non-human organisms do not share this same awareness, then they either have no agency or are, at best, only agent-like. We currently hold the scientifically unjustified conviction that agency is necessarily mind dependent. We mistakenly believe that undifferentiated and mindless biological goals play no role in their evolved and differentiated minded forms.
We mistakenly assume that because biological goals can only be represented in human minds, they only exist in human minds and are therefore a creation of human minds. But the goals (purposes, values, reasons for the behaviour) of non-human organisms are not spoken or thought; they are demonstrated in their behaviour, and they existed (were real) in nature long before their minded evolutionary human development occurred.
Second, converse reasoning that denies the evolutionary development of minded human agency (purpose, values, etc.) out of real and mindless biological agency while conversely claiming that biological agency is a fictitious creation (cognitive or other metaphor) of human agency.
Biological agency is not a metaphorical creation of human minds: human agency is a real evolutionary development of biological agency.
Third, the metaphor fallacy. The treatment of anthropomorphic humanizing language (human-talk) as metaphor, and minded humanizing language as cognitive metaphor. This fallacy interprets the relationship between biological and human agencies using the logic of a literary device, the metaphor, in which one of the relata is always figurative (unreal). This forces the real evolutionary likeness between biological agency and human agency to be treated as an 'as if' (unreal) likeness, rather than a similarity resulting from real evolutionary connection. Were a literary device the appropriate mechanism for making this comparison then, in strict literary terms, the likeness is not metaphor but simile.
Fourth, and related to the third, we make an agency error – whereby anthropomorphic language (the language treated as cognitive metaphor) is interpreted literally as claiming that mindless organisms have cognitive faculties. Under closer inspection it is evident that, in general, such language is not, in fact, referencing minded human agency (human cognitive faculties), but the mindless biological agency that is a consequence of shared evolutionary ancestry. This is the traditional and mistaken assumption that the agency we imply when using anthropomorphic language is the unique agency of humans when, in fact, its intended meaning relates to the universal biological agency that is present in all living organisms.
When we say that a plant ‘wants’ or ‘needs’ water we are not suggesting that plants experience intentional mental states, but that they share with us the universal biological agential disposition to survive, reproduce, and flourish. This is a form of biological empathy - but not a communion of minds, more a recognition of shared biological values.
Fifth, that science is forced to use the language of cognitive metaphor, not so much for literary flourish, our inherent human cognitive bias, or the convenience of brevity, but more because of the empathy we feel in the face of the biological agency and biological values expressed by other species in the community of life.
Sixth, our lack of understanding of the reasons why we resort to human-talk, that is, the reasons why we are strongly persuaded to use intentional language when describing agential but non-intentional organisms, especially because we have inadequate technical language to describe biological agency, meaning we resort to anthropomorphism.
Anthropomorphic analogical language is, in general, not trying to convey the as if language of cognitive metaphor, but the real likeness of biological simile (the result of evolutionary connection).
From an evolutionary perspective human agency evolved out of (is a subset of) biological agency and thus the proximate minded and therefore (often) subjective goals of human agency, are subordinate to the ultimate objective goals of biological agency.
In sum, we have yet to scientifically accept that biological agency is not a metaphorical creation of human agency: human agency is a real evolutionary development of biological agency.
Historically, this philosophical confusion has been perpetuated by a pre-Darwinian anthropocentrism that understood life as Special Creation, rather than evolution with modification from a common ancestor.
If we regard anthropomorphism as cognitive metaphor or heuristic, then we not only devalue, but deny, the real evolutionarily graded agential reality of the organisms, structures, processes, and behaviours that unite the community of life.
If biological agency, goals, purposes, and values are real then their investigation can be transferred out of the realm of philosophical speculation and into the domain of scientific explanation.
Forms of biological agency
For humans, autonomy entails a conscious distinction between ‘self’ and ‘other’. Our minds provide a sense of self as they segregate the world into objects of experience, focus on a limited range of these, group them according to similarities and differences, and prioritize them according to purpose, interest, or preparation for action. For simplicity we can refer to this complex agential process as mental adaptation, which is a form of human agency.
This minded human agency evolved out of the capacity of mindless organisms (as revealed by their behaviour) to discriminate between objects of their environment and to prioritize these in relation to themselves and their behaviour. That mindless adaptation is a demonstration of both autonomy and agency. And it is clearly out of this mindless process of adaptation that minded adaptation evolved.
Biological agency is manifest through agential behaviour as expressed by each biological body. This behaviour is relatively uniform within a species due to their similarity of physical form. The agency of a plant is expressed in very different ways from from that of a fish. However, since all organisms arose from a common ancestor the agential similarities between organisms is always a matter of degree.
When considering agency as it relates to minds, five kinds can be distinguished each building on the former:
mindless inorganic 'agency' - the ordering 'behaviour' of inanimate matter
mindless biological agency - agential (goal-directed) behaviour that is not mind-directed (also found in minded organisms e.g. unconscious sweating)
unconscious minded agency - the unconscious, intuitive or instinctive behaviour of minded creatures e.g. fear of snakes
conscious minded agency - as behaviour that is a consequence of conscious deliberation
collective or cultural agency - behaviour that is a product of collective learning usually communicated through symbolic language as socio-cultural norms
A universal human morality seeks to maximize human flourishing, both now and in the future, by striving towards a long-term harmonious relationship between humans, the community of life, and planet Earth
Courtesy NASA – Accessed 28 August 2019
Introduction to Ethics
Academy of ideas – 2013- 10:07
CrashCourse – 2016 – 9:33
Peter Singer on Becoming a Moral Realist
Future of Life Institute – June 2021 – 51:04
First published on the internet – 1 March 2019
. . . added the ‘taking of a moral position’ – 3 August 2022